Representation of Concepts as Frames by Petersen, Wiebke
Representation of Concepts as Frames
Wiebke Petersen
Reprint: Originally published in Skilters, J., Toccafondi, F. & Stem-
berger, G. (eds.), Complex Cognition and Qualitative Science. Volume
2 of The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Commu-
nication, 151-170, University of Latvia, Riga, 2007.
Abstract
Concepts can be represented as frames, i. e., recursive attribute-value structures.
Frames assign unique values to attributes. Concepts can be classiVed into four
groups with respect to both relationality and referential uniqueness: sortal, indi-
vidual, proper relational, and functional concepts. The paper deVnes frames as
directed graphs with labeled nodes and arcs and it discusses the graph structures
of frames for sortal and relational concepts. It aims at a classiVcation of frame
graphs that reWects the given concept classiVcation. By giving a new deVnition of
type signatures, the status of attributes in frames is clariVed and the connection
between functional concepts, their sortal uses, and their associated attributes is
explained.
1 Introduction
According to Barsalou (1992), frames, understood as recursive attribute-value
structures, are used as a general format in accounting for the content of mental
concepts. The attributes in a concept frame are the general properties or dimen-
sions by which the respective concept is described (e. g., color, spokesperson,
habitat. . . )1. Their values are concrete or underspeciVed speciVcations (e. g.,
[color: red], [spokesperson: Ellen Smith], [habitat: jungle] . . . ). For exam-
ple, ball can be characterized by [shape: round], specifying its concrete shape,
and [color: color], specifying that it has a color which is not further speciVed.
The attribute values can themselves be complex frames and thus described by ad-
ditional attributes. E. g., the value jungle of the attribute habitat can be further
1 Throughout the paper we will mark types by using small, bold letters, while attributes are written
in small capitals.
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
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speciVed by attributes like average temperature or rain season. Frames are
thus recursive, and it is this feature that renders them Wexible enough to repre-
sent information of any desired grade of detail.
Barsalou & Hale (1993) argue that frame theory is independent with respect to
various theories of categorization such as checklist theory (cf. Katz 1972; Lyons
1977), exemplar theory (cf. Rosch & Mervis 1975; Brooks 1978), prototype the-
ory (cf. Rosch 1973, 1975; Smith & Medin 1981) or connectionist networks (cf.
McClelland & Rumelhart 1981; Shanks 1991). Frames are rather a model for the
representation of concepts and therefore establish an alternative to pure feature-
list representations. The advantage of frames over predicates of First Order Logic
is that they do not force one to stipulate a Vxed arity and that substructures can
be addressed via labeled symbols instead of ordered argument positions.
Being motivated primarily by empirical research, Barsalou’s focus in develop-
ing his frame theory was not on giving a formal theory. However, a formal theory
of frames is necessary if they are to be employed in knowledge management or
language-processing systems and it is the project of developing such a formal
theory that concerns us here. For our account of concept decomposition we will
use Barsalou’s (1992) cognitive frame theory as a starting point. We will show
how frames can be represented by labeled graphs and will establish a type system
based on them. Our aim is to develop a formal theory of frames that enables us
to describe all kinds of concepts and that is plausible as an adequate basis for a
frame-based cognitive semantics explaining both decompositional and composi-
tional phenomena in a uniVed way.
In aiming at the decomposition of concepts that are expressible by nouns, our
approach aligns with well-established graph-based knowledge representation for-
malisms that focus on situations such as frame semantics (Fillmore 1982) and on
propositions as in conceptual graph theory (Sowa 1984).
1.1 Frame-based knowledge representation
Frame structures appeared in several disciplines in the 1970s. In Cognitive Sci-
ence, their introduction led to a paradigm change (cf. Fahlmann 1977; Minsky
1975): Instead of being taken as atomic units, concepts came to be understood
as classes of highly structured entities describable in terms of recursive attribute-
value structures. Feature lists and binary features represented a preliminary stage
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in this process (cf. Chomsky & Halle 1968). The frame perspective also became
prominent in ArtiVcial Intelligence (AI) and Linguistics. One of the best-known
frame-based knowledge representation languages of AI is KL-ONE (Brachman &
Schmolze 1985), which is the predecessor of a whole family of knowledge repre-
sentation languages, the socalled description logics (cf. Donini et al. 1996; Baader
et al. 2004).
In Linguistics, frames were Vrst introduced in Fillmore’s case grammar in order
to represent verbs and the relational roles of their arguments (Fillmore 1968). This
early work laid the foundations for the development of frame semantics (Fillmore
1982). Kay (1979) introduced the idea of describing language signs with complex
frame structures and proposed frame uniVcation for their manipulation. These
frame structures are now known in Computational Linguistics (CL) as feature
structures and are heavily used in uniVcation-based grammars (cf. Shieber et al.
1983; Shieber 1986). Inspired by the work of Aït-Kaci on Ψ-terms (Aït-Kaci 1984),
type hierarchies with appropriateness conditions were introduced in CL in order
to restrict the set of admissible typed feature structures (Carpenter 1992).
Further knowledge representation structures that are related to frames are Se-
mantic Networks (cf. Quilian 1968; Helbig 2006) and Conceptual Graphs (cf. Sowa
1984, 2000).
1.2 A classiVcation of concepts
Concepts can be distinguished with respect to both their relationality and their
referential uniqueness (Löbner 1985). Sortal and individual concepts are non-
relational and thus typically have no possessor argument. Sortal concepts (e. g.,
apple) denote classical categories and have no unique referents. Individual con-
cepts (e. g., Mary), in contrast, have unique referents. Proper relational and func-
tional concepts are both relational in that their referents are given by a relation to
a possessor (e. g., brother of Tom, mother of Tom). It is characteristic of functional
concepts (e. g., mother) that they establish a right-unique mapping from posses-
sors to referents and thus are uniquely referring.2 In contrast, unique reference
is not generally implied for proper relational concepts (e. g., brother). Figure 1
shows the resulting concept classiVcation.
2 Note that throughout this paper the term functional concept is always used in the sense of describing
a concept that establishes a functional mapping. Hence, functional in this paper does not mean that
the concept denotes objects which have a special function.
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The meaning of a given concept may be shifted: E. g., the concept mother
which, in its normal use, is uniquely referring and relational (the mother of Tom)
and thus functional can be also used in contexts like Mothers like gambling or
The mothers of the constitution were wise, where it is used as a sortal or proper
relational concept, respectively. Suchmeaning shifts are always context triggered.
non-unique reference unique reference
non-relational SC, sortal concept:
person, house, verb, wood
IC, individual concept:
Mary, pope, sun
relational RC, proper relational concept:
brother, argument, entrance
FC, functional concept:
mother, meaning, distance,
spouse
Figure 1: classification of concepts
Most languages reWect the classiVcation of concepts. E. g., in English, nouns
expressing concepts without unique reference (SCs and RCs) are usually used
without a deVnite article. Nouns expressing relational concepts (RCs and FCs)
are usually used in possessive constructions, where the possessor is speciVed
synthetically (the cat’s paw) or analytically (the paw of the cat). However, there
is a considerable variation in the expression of deVniteness and possession across
languages.3
2 Frame graphs
Our concept-decomposition framework should be formally explicit and cogni-
tively adequate. Therefore, we aim at keeping our frame model as simple and
rigid as possible. We do not want to introduce any elements into our model lan-
guage for merely technical or computational reasons. In Petersen & Werning
(2007) we explain how our frame model can be extended to account for cognitive
typicality eUects. By using oscillatory neural networks as a biologically motivated
model, we show how frames might be implemented in the cortex.
Since frames for concepts are recursive attribute-value-structures, each attribute
of a frame establishes a relation between the objects denoted by the concept and
3 The four concept classes (sortal, individual, proper relational, and functional) are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive. For more details on our concept classiVcation, on its linguistic reWections,
and on context-triggered meaning-shifts have a look at the webpages of the research group FOR600
Functional Concepts and Frames (http://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/Uf).
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the value of the attribute; e. g., the attribute sex in the frame for woman assigns
the value female to each denoted object. In accordance with the examples in
Barsalou (1992), we assume that attributes in frames assign unique values to ob-
jects and thus describe functional relations. The values themselves can be com-
plex frames. Section 3 discusses attributes in frames in greater detail.
We model frames as connected directed graphs with labeled nodes (types) and
arcs (attributes). Our deVnitions follow the notational conventions in Carpenter
(1992).
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Figure 2: lolly frame
Figure 2 shows the graph of an example frame representing knowledge about
lollies with long green sticks and round red bodies produced in factories. The
double-encircled node lolly is the central node of the frame; it shows that the
graph represents a frame about lollies. The outgoing arcs of the lolly-node stand
for the attributes of the represented lollies and point to their values. Hence,
each denoted lolly has a stick and a body. The values of the attributes body
and stick are themselves complex frames, both having three attributes, namely
color, shape and producer. The fact that the stick and the body of each denoted
lolly are produced in the same factory is indicated by the single factory-node to
which the two producer-arcs from stick and body point. The single factory-
node excludes the possibility that the body is produced in a candy factory in
Belgium while the stick is produced in a paper mill in Canada.
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DeVnition 1 Given a set type of types and a Vnite set attr of attributes. A frame
is a tuple F = (Q, q¯, δ, θ,=) where:
•Q is a Vnite set of nodes,
• q¯ ∈ Q is the central node,
• δ : attr ×Q→ Q is the partial transition function,
• θ : Q→type is the total node typing function,
•=⊆ Q×Q is a symmetric and anti-reWexive inequation relation.
Furthermore, the underlying undirected graph (Q,E) with edge set E =
{{q1, q2} | ∃a ∈attr: δ(a, q1) = q2} is connected.
The underlying directed graph of a frame is the graph (Q, ~E) with edge set ~E =
{(q1, q2) | ∃a ∈attr: δ(a, q1) = q2}
If θ(q¯) = t, we say that the frame is of type t; and if θ(q) = t is true for a node
q, we call the node q a t-node. Furthermore, if δ(a, q1) = q2 is true for a frame,
we say that the frame has an a-arc from q1 to q2; this a-arc is an outgoing arc for
node q1 and an incoming arc for q2. Contrary to other frame deVnitions, we do
not demand that all nodes of a frame can be reached via directed arcs from its
central node.4
The types are ordered in a type hierarchy, which induces a subsumption order
on frames: “We think of our types as organizing feature structures into natural
classes.[. . . ] Thus it is natural to think of the types as being organized in an
inheritance hierarchy based on their generality”, (Carpenter 1992:11).
DeVnition 2 A type hierarchy (type,w) is a Vnite partial ordered set which forms
a join semilattice, i. e., for any two types there exists a least upper bound. A type t1 is
a subtype of a type t2 if t1 w t2.
DeVnition 3 Given a type hierarchy (type,w) and a Vnite set attr of attributes.
A frame F = (Q, q¯, δ, θ,=) subsumes a frame F ′ = (Q′, q¯′, δ′, θ′,=′), notated
as F v F ′, if and only if there exists a total function h : Q→ Q′ such that:
•h(q¯) = q¯′,
• if q ∈ Q, a ∈ attr, and if δ(a, q) is deVned, then h(δ(a, q)) = δ′(a, h(q)),
• for each q ∈ Q: θ(q) v θ′(h(q)),
• if q1 = q2, then h(q1)=′ h(q2).
4 The claim that all nodes of a frame can be reached from its central node is common in most frame
theories (cf. Carpenter 1992; Barsalou 1992) because they usually consider only frames for sortal
concepts.
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Figure 3: subsumption example
An example of the subsumption relation is given in Figure 3: It shows a rather
unspeciVc lolly-frame subsuming the more speciVc lolly-frame from Figure 2.
Bold arrows mark the function h from DeVnition 3. The example shows that
DeVnition 3 captures our general understanding of subsumption: When a con-
cept A subsumes a concept B then A is more general than B, i. e., A imposes less
restrictions on the objects it denotes than B.
The deVnition of frames as labeled graphs yields the problem that two frames
with diUerent node sets are always diUerent, even if all their labels match. E. g.,
the two frames F = (Q, q¯, δ, θ,=) and F ′ = (Q′, q¯′, δ′, θ′,=′) with Q =
{a, b}, q¯ = a, δ(G, a) = b, θ(a) = s, θ(b) = t and Q′ = {c, d}, q¯′ = c, δ′(G, c) =
d, θ′(c) = s, θ′(d) = t are unequal due to the diUerent node sets (Q 6= Q′)
although they can both be drawn as
factory
stick green
long
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COLOR
SHAPE
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7
. Since the two frames F and F ′
subsume each other, i. e. F v F ′ and F ′ v F , the subsumption relation deVnes
no partial order on frames, but merely a preorder.
Looking at the lolly example in Figure 2 it is obvious that the information
represented in a frame does not depend on the concrete set of nodes. It depends
rather on how the nodes are connected by directed arcs and how the nodes and
arcs are labeled. However, it is not possible to simply replace the nodes in the
frame deVnition by their labels, since two distinct nodes of a graph can be labeled
with the same type. E. g., we could modify the lolly-frame in Figure 2 so that the
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stick and the body of the described lollies were produced in two distinct factories,
where one is located in Belgium and one in Canada. The frame in the middle
of Figure 4 shows another example of a frame with several equally typed nodes.
Therefore, it is convenient to deVne the alphabetic variance relation: A frame F is
an alphabetic variant of a frame F ′ (written as F ∼ F ′) if and only if F v F ′ and
F ′ v F are both true. The alphabetic variance relation is an equivalence relation
over the collection of frames. It follows immediately that subsumption modulo
the alphabetic variance relation deVnes a partial order on the equivalent classes
of frames. From now on, to simplify matters, we will not distinguish between a
frame and its equivalence class under alphabetic variance.
In order to characterize the graphs underlying frames, we use the following
terminology:
DeVnition 4 A node q0 ∈ Q is said to be a root of a frame F = (Q, q¯, δ, θ,=)
if for each q ∈ Q there is a Vnite sequence of attributes a1 . . . an ∈ attr ∗ with
δ(an, . . . , δ(a2, δ(a1, q0)) . . .) = q, i. e., q0 and q are connected by a Vnite directed
path.
DeVnition 5 A node q ∈ Q is said to be a source of a frame F = (Q, q¯, δ, θ,=) if
q has no incoming arc (i. e., q has indegree 0). Analogously, q is a sink of a frame
if q has no outgoing arc (i. e., q has outdegree 0).
The frame in Figure 2 has exactly one source, namely the node labeled lolly,
and Vve sinks, i. e., the nodes labeled red, round, factory, and green, long. The
source of this frame is simultaneously a root of the frame.
A frame is said to be acyclic if the underlying directed graph is acyclic, i. e., if
it is not possible to Vnd a way along directed arcs leading from a node back to
itself. It is obvious that an acyclic frame has at most one root. Our experience
in decomposing concepts into frames indicates that frames for lexical concepts
are generally acyclic. Through our involvement in the research group FOR600
Functional Concepts and Frames, we have access to more than a hundred frame
graphs of diUerent lexical concepts that were drawn by approximately twenty
(test) persons; none of the frames are cyclic. However, there are some rare self-
referential concepts like egoist or narcissistwhose frame graphs have to be cyclic.5
In spite of these exceptions, we consider only concepts with acyclic frames in this
paper.
5 Thanks to Magdalena Schwager for pointing out the problem of self-referential concepts to us.
50
Representation of Concepts as Frames
factory long
stick
object
P
R
O
D
U
C
E
R
S
H
A
P
E
S
T
I
C
K
factory
object stick green
long
PR
OD
UC
ER
COLOR
SHAPE
STICK
3
personmale
person person
person
M
O
T
H
E
R
M
O
T
H
E
R
FA
T
H
E
R
F
A
T
H
E
R
SEX
6=
person person
person person
person female
F
A
T
H
E
R
M
O
TH
ER
FA
TH
ER
M
O
T
H
E
R
6=
F
A
T
H
E
R
SEX
4
red
body round
lolly factory
stick green
long
CO
LO
R
SHAPE
PRODUCER
PR
OD
UC
ER
COLOR
SHAPE
BO
D
Y
STIC
K
factory
object stick green
long
PR
OD
UC
ER
COLOR
SHAPE
STICK
1
Figure 4: frames for different concepts (left: stick; middle: brother; right: lolly)
Figure 4 shows three frames belonging to concepts of three diUerent concept
classes (again the central nodes are double-encircled).6 The right frame for the
sortal concept lolly has already been discussed abov . The left frame represents
the functional concept stick and the frame in the middle corresponds to the proper
relational concept brother. The stick-frame characterizes a stick by being the stick
of an object (i. e., by a functional relation) and by additional sortal features like be-
ing long and being produced in a factory. Functional concepts diUer fundamentally
from sortal concepts, since their potential referents are the values of an attribute
which is identical with the functional concept. Although the stick-frame seems
to be a substructure of the frame for the sortal concept lolly, the fundamental
diUerence is encoded inherently in the graph structure of the frames: The central
node of the functional frame, i. e., the frame for the functional concept stick, has
an incoming arc while that of the sortal frame for lolly has solely outgoing arcs.
Both frames characteristically have a root. It is the incoming arc (labeled by an
attribute corresponding to a functional concept) which establishes the functional
relation from potential possessors to the referents of the functional concept.
The frame for the proper relational concept brother is more complex. It de-
scribes a brother as a male person for which a second person exists with whom
it shares mother and father. The undirected arc between the two person-nodes
labeled with 6= indicates the inequality relation and ensures that the two nodes
6 Throughout this paper we do not deal with individual concepts since they require a rather diUerent
treatment: The graphs underlying their frames do not diUer but their central nodes are not labeled
by arbitrary types but by particular entity types. Petersen & Werning (2007) give some examples
of frames for individual concepts.
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can never be uniVed.7 The peculiarity of this frame is that the two nodes labeled
person cannot be reached along directed paths from each other and that there
is no third node from which both nodes can be reached. Thus, the potential refer-
ents of the central person-node are characterized by the sortal feature male and
especially by the existence of a referent for the non-central source of type per-
son, which represents the possessor argument of the proper relational concept
brother. The connection between the central node and the node for the posses-
sor argument is established indirectly via the shared values of the father- and
mother-attributes. Since the relation between a person and his or her mother (or
father) is a many-to-one relation, the brother-frame does not set up a functional
relation between the possessor argument and the referents of the central node. It
is characteristic for a proper relational frame, i. e., a frame for a proper relational
concept, that it has a node which is a source but from which the central node is
not reachable along directed arcs.
The example frames show that what type of concept is represented by an
acyclic frame is determined by the properties of the central node and the ques-
tion whether or not the frame has a root or a source. In the remainder of this
section we therefore use the binary features “± has source” (±ES), “± has root”
(±ER), “± central node is a source” (±CS), and “± central node is a root” (±CR)
to classify directed acyclic graphs with central nodes. In order to gain a complete
list of possible classes we apply the attribute exploration technique known from
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) (Ganter & Wille 1999), which is implemented in
the software Concept Explorer.8 During an attribute exploration, Concept Explorer
successively presents implications of properties (in the terminology of FCA: at-
tribute implications) which the user must either accept or reject (by oUering a
counter example). The process ends when the canonical universe of the proper-
ties is completed (Osswald & Petersen 2003), i. e., the closure of sets of compatible
properties is determined. The procedure guarantees that the number of impli-
cations presented is minimal. Figure 5 shows the result of the exploration: The
implicational statements on the left are those which we aXrmed during the ex-
ploration process. The resulting concept lattice is given on the right side of the
Vgure.
7 The inequality relation becomes important as soon as information combining procedures like uniV-
cation are applied to frames, as these procedures have to preserve explicitly stated inequalities.
8 http://conexp.sourceforge.net/
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(1) necessarily +ES;
(2) if −ER, then −CR;
(3) if −CS, then −CR;
(4) if +ER and −CR, then −CS;
(5) if +CS and −CR then −ER;
(6) if +CS and +ER then +CR;
(7) if +CR then +CS and +ER.
Figure 5: basis of implications and concept lattice
The seven implicational statements are true for the following reasons: The
second and the third statement follow immediately from the meaning of the exis-
tential quantiVer and the deVnition of roots and sources. Since an acyclic directed
graph can be physically modeled by a system of tubes where each tube has a slope,
the remaining statements can be easily veriVed: Roots in such a tube system can
be easily recognized by the fact that water Wows through all tubes if it is poured in
at a root. A source in such a tube system is a tube junction that is not reached by
water poured into the system at any other point. Since water cannot run upwards,
it cannot Wow in circles. Hence, there is never more than one root in a tube sys-
tem; and if there is a root, it is necessarily the only source of the system as well.
The statements (1) and (4)-(7) follow immediately from these considerations.
Taking into account the implicational statements in Figure 5, there are four
property distributions remaining that are consistent. Hence, the chosen prop-
erties classify acyclic frames into four classes. Figure 6 lists them and shows a
typical graph with the required properties for each distribution.
DeVnition 6 A sortal frame is an acyclic frame whose central node is a root. A
relational frame is an acyclic frame with a source which is not the central node. A
proper relational frame is an acyclic frame with at least two sources of which one is
the central node. A functional frame is an acyclic frame with a root which is not
the central node.
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CR CS ER ES typical graph frame class
+ + + + sortal
- - + + functional
- + - + proper relational
- - - + ???
Figure 6: classification of acyclic frames
From our experience in modeling concepts with frames, we expect that, at least
in typical unmarked cases, the Vrst three frame classes in Figure 6 correspond to
the concept classes discussed in section 1.2.
Conjecture 1 In general, sortal concepts are represented by sortal frames, func-
tional concepts are represented by functional frames, and (proper) relational concepts
are represented by (proper) relational frames. However, not every arbitrary acyclic
frame models a cognitively relevant or even lexicalized concept.
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Figure 7: frame for father of a niece
The fourth frame class does not correspond as nicely to a concept class as the
others do. We assume that frames for this class model non-lexicalized concepts
like father of a niece whose frame is given in Figure 7.
We only found one frame belonging to the fourth class that seems to be lexical-
ized, namely the one for brother-in-law (and analogically for sister-in-law). The
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corresponding frame is shown on the left in Figure 8.9 Nevertheless, brother-in-
law only appears to be a concept whose frame belongs to the fourth frame class
as the right frame of Figure 8 illustrates. Since the spouse-relation is a symmetric
one-to-one relation, the direction of the spouse-arc of the frame can be reversed.
The content of the left frame can be paraphrased as male person who is the spouse
of someone who has a sibling and the right one as male person whose spouse has a
sibling. Since brother-in-law is a proper relational concept that takes one posses-
sor argument (my brother-in-law), the paraphrases of the two frames show that
the left one analyzes brother-in-law incorrectly as a relational concept with an
extra argument.
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Figure 8: two frames for brother-in-law
From the frames in this section we can draw two main conclusions: First, the
arguments of relational concepts are modeled in frames as sources that are not
identical to the central node. Second, the functionality of functional concepts is
modeled by an incoming arc at the central node.
3 Attributes and type signatures
As Guarino (1992) points out, frame-based knowledge engineering systems as
well as feature-structure-based linguistic formalisms normally force a radical
choice between attributes and types. Therefore, frames like the one in Figure
2 are common, where the rather unspeciVc value stick is assigned to the attribute
stick. The parallel naming of the attribute stick and the type stick suggests a
systematic relationship between the attribute and the type that is not captured by
the formalism.
A second problem addressed in Guarino (1992) concerns the question which
binary relations should be expressed by attributes. If one allows attributes to be
9 Strictly speaking, brother-in-law is polysemous; it means either brother of spouse or husband of
sibling. We only consider the latter meaning here.
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unrestricted arbitrary binary relations, this leads to frames like the following one,
which was Vrst discussed in Woods (1975):
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Although height and hit can be represented by binary predicates, the onto-
logical status of the link established between John and 6 feet and between John
andMary diUers fundamentally.
As stated before, we presuppose that attributes of frames establish many-to-
one, i. e., functional relations between the nodes they are attached to and their
values. The question arises how attributes and functional concepts are connected.
All sample attributes we have used so far (stick, color, . . . ) correspond to func-
tional concepts. Guarino (1992) distinguishes between the denotational and the
relational interpretation of a relational concept. This distinction can be used to
explain how functional concepts can act as concepts and as attributes: Let there
be a universe U and a set of functional concepts F . A functional concept (like
any concept) denotes a set of entities:
∆ : F → 2U
(e. g.,∆(mother) = {m|m is the mother of someone}).
A functional concept also has a relational interpretation:
% : F → 2U×U
(e. g., %(mother) = {(p,m)|m is the mother of p}).
Additionally, the denotational and the relational interpretation of a functional
attribute have to respect the following consistency postulate (Guarino 1992): Any
value of a relationally interpreted functional concept is also an instance of the
denotation of that concept. E. g., if (p,m) ∈ %(mother), then m ∈ ∆(mother).
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Furthermore, the relational interpretation of a functional concept f is a function,
i. e., if (a, b), (a, c) ∈ %(f), then b = c.
These considerations allow us to clarify the ontological status of attributes
in frames: Attributes in frames are relationally interpreted functional concepts.
Hence, attributes are not frames themselves and therefore are unstructured.
Frames decompose concepts into relationally interpreted functional concepts.
Thus, functional concepts embody the concept type on which categorization is
based. The diUerentiation between the denotational and the relational interpre-
tation of functional concepts is consistent with Barsalou’s view on attributes: “I
deVne an attribute as a concept that describes an aspect of at least some category
members. For example, color describes an aspect of birds, and location describes
an aspect of vacations. A concept is an attribute only when it describes an as-
pect of a larger whole. When people consider color in isolation (e. g., thinking
about their favorite color), it is not an attribute but is simply a concept”, Barsalou
(1992:30).
In the theory of typed feature structures, it is common to enrich the plain type
hierarchy by an appropriateness speciVcation. It regulates which attributes are
appropriate for feature structures of a special type and restricts the values of
the appropriate attributes (Carpenter 1992).10 We adapt this technique in order
to restrict the class of admissible frames. However, we consequently dismiss
the artiVcial distinction between attributes and types in our deVnition of type
signatures: In contrast to the standard deVnition (Carpenter 1992:86) the attribute
set is merely a subset of the type set. Hence, attributes occur in two diUerent roles:
as names of binary functional relations between types and as types themselves.
DeVnition 7 Given a type hierarchy (type,w) and a set of attributes attr ⊆ type.
An appropriateness speciVcation on (type,w) is a partial function Approp : attr×
type→ type such that for each a ∈ attr the following holds:
• attribute introduction: There is a type Intro(a) ∈ type with:
– Approp(a, Intro(a)) = a and
– for every t ∈ type: if Approp(a, t) is deVned, then Intro(a) v t.
• speciVcation closure: If Approp(a, s) is deVned and s v t, then Approp(a, t)
is deVned and Approp(a, s) v Approp(a, t).
10 Type signatures can be automatically induced from sets of untyped feature structures, i. e., frames
where the central node is a root and in which only the maximal paths are typed. With FCAType, an
implemented system for such inductions is available (Kilbury et al. 2006; Petersen 2006).
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• attribute consistency: If Approp(a, s) = t, then a v t.
A type signature is a tuple (type,w, attr,Approp), where (type,w) is a type hier-
archy, attr ⊆ type is a set of attributes, and Approp : attr × type → type is an
appropriateness speciVcation.
The Vrst two conditions on an appropriateness speciVcation are standard in the
theory of type signatures (Carpenter 1992), except that we tighten up the attribute
introduction condition. We claim that the introductory type of an attribute ‘a’
carries the appropriateness condition ‘a : a’. With the attribute-consistency con-
dition we ensure that Guarino’s consistency postulate holds and that Barsalou’s
view on frames, attributes, and values is modeled appropriately: “At their core,
frames contain attribute-value sets. Attributes are concepts that represent as-
pects of a category’s members, and values are subordinate concepts of attributes”,
(Barsalou 1992:43). Hence, the possible values of an attribute are subconcepts of
the denotationally interpreted functional concept. This is reWected in the type
signature by the condition that the possible values of an attribute are restricted to
subtypes of the type corresponding to the attribute.
We call a framewell-typedwith respect to a type signature if all attributes of the
frame are licensed by the type signature and if additionally the attribute values
are consistent with the appropriateness speciVcation.
DeVnition 8 Given a type signature (type,w, attr,Approp), a frame F =
(Q, q¯, δ, θ,=) is well-typed with respect to the type signature, if and only if for
each q ∈ Q the following holds:
If δ(a, q) is deVned, then Approp(a, θ(q)) is also deVned and Approp(a, θ(q)) v
θ(δ(a, q)).
The deVnition of the appropriateness speciVcation guarantees that every arc
in a well-typed frame points to a node that is typed by a subtype of the type
corresponding to the attribute labeling the arc. The decomposition of concepts
into frames requires that the frame in question be well-typed.
A small example type signature is given in Figure 9. The appropriateness spec-
iVcation is split up into single appropriateness conditions: The expression ‘taste:
taste’ at type objects means that the attribute taste is appropriate for frames
of type objects and its value is restricted to frames of type taste or subtypes of
taste. The attribute conditions are passed on downwards. Hence, the type apple
inherits the appropriateness condition ‘taste: taste’ from its upper neighbor ob-
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specification closure condition. The definition of the type signature makes 
sure that the permissible values of an attribute are subtypes of the attribute 
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are subtypes of the type taste. Notice that the subtypes of an attribute type are 
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the first one is well-typed while the second one violates the appropriateness 
condition SHAPE: round at type apple.
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Figure 9: exampl type signature
jects. It also inherits the appropriateness condition ‘shape: shape’, but tightens
it up to ‘shape: round’, which is permissible by the speciVcation closure condi-
tion. The deVnition of the type signature makes sure that the permissible values
of an attribute are subtypes of the attribute type. Hence, the possible values of
taste, i. e., sweet, hot, sour, and so forth, are subtypes of the type taste. Notice
that the subtypes of an attri te type are not generally attribute types themselves.
Figure 10 shows two frames, where the Vrst one is well-typed while the second
one violates the appropriateness condition ‘shape: round’ at type apple.
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Figure 10: well-typed versus non well-typed frame
Due to the recursive structure of frames, it is possible to specify the attribute
values with frames of any desired complexity. Since the length of attribute paths
in frames is not restricted, the frames can fan out in depth as depicted in the
upper part of Figure 11. However, Barsalou allows frames to grow in an additional
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respect: “Within a frame, each attribute may be associated with its own frame of
more speciVc attributes. [. . .] These secondary attributes often have frames as
well. [. . .] Even these attributes [of frames of secondary attributes] continue to
have frames”, Barsalou (1992:33). The possibility of further specifying attributes
as well as their values by additional attributes results in the double recursive and
self-similar structure of Barsalou’s frames, which is depicted in the lower part of
Figure 11.
Figure 11: Fanning out of classical frames (top) and Barsalou’s self-similar frames (bottom)
Our approach to frames, which reWects the parallelism of the denotational and
the relational interpretation of functional concepts in the deVnition of type sig-
natures, captures Barsalou’s idea about frames, but avoids the double recursive
structure. Since attributes are types at the same time, further attribute-value pairs
can specify them; this is in accordance with Barsalou’s claim that “frames repre-
sent all types of concepts, whether they are free-standing concepts, such as bird
and vacation, or whether they are attributes such as color for bird and location for
vacation”, (Barsalou 1992:31). However, this further speciVcation will only take
place if the attribute is used as a type, i. e., if it labels a frame node, and never
when it is used as a functional attribute and labels a frame arc. Our lolly-frame
in Figure 2 exempliVes this perspective: The attribute stick labels an arc as well
as a node, but it is the value of the attribute to which further attribute arcs are
attached, such that it constitutes the sortal stick-subframe in Figure 12.
The attributes producer, color and shape are attributes of sticks and not of
the attribute stick, since stick is the partial function that assigns sticks to objects.
Note that the stick-frame in Figure 12 diUers from the stick-frame in Figure 4
60
Representation of Concepts as Frames
factory
stick green
long
PR
OD
UC
ER
COLOR
SHAPE
7
Figure 12: Frame for the sortal reading of stick
(left) in that it does not relate the stick to an object to which it is attached. If
it is not embedded into a larger object frame (e. g., a lolly-frame) it models the
sortal reading of stick as in the sentence these days sticks are mostly produced in
big factories. Such context-triggered meaning-shifts from relational concepts to
non-relational readings are very common; the frame structures of the concepts
help to explain and visualize them. However, we would like to emphasize that
the stick-frame of Figure 4 (left) must not be confused with the attribute stick
itself: Stick is a functional concept whose functional frame is given in Figure 4
(left); although it is functional, it denotes – like the sortal stick-frame in Figure
12 – sticks. However, in contrast to the sortal frame its denotation is determined
by a functional relation from a possessor argument (here the potential referents
of the object-node). The attribute stick is the relationally interpreted functional
concept stick and therefore a function; it is not a frame.
The ability to give explicit frames for functional concepts that diUer fundamen-
tally from frames for the sortal readings of those concepts is a novelty. It is made
possible by our novel deVnition of frames, which no longer demands that the cen-
tral node be a root of the frame graph. We know of no other explicit approach
to frames for functional concepts.
Having motivated our approach to type signatures we will now sketch how it
oUers an elegant solution to problems in grammar engineering that occur when
frames are employed as semantic representations. To model how adjectives mod-
ify the meaning of a noun it has to be explained that in a phrase like red body
the value red is assigned to the attribute color, while round body modiVes the
value of the attribute shape. An unsatisfactory solution would be to have a single
rule for each adjective dimension, i. e., for each attribute. Instead, we propose to
introduce the notion of a minimal upper attribute of a type. An upper attribute
of a type is an attribute which is a supertype of the type with respect to the type
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hierarchy. Hence, a minimal upper attribute of a type is a minimal element of the
set of upper attributes of the type. According to the type signature in Figure 9,
the minimal upper type of red is color and the one for round is shape. Hence,
we can formulate a single rule for all those cases: SimpliVed, it states that in a
frame which represents the meaning of a phrase consisting of an adjective and
a noun, the type corresponding to the adjective is assigned as a value to the mini-
mal upper attribute of the adjective type. Such a rule would even capture some
interesting cases of ambiguity. Consider the polysemous adjective hot, which
means either being very warm or being very spicy. In a type hierarchy the type
hot could be placed such that it is a subtype of the attribute type temperature as
well as of the attribute type taste (cf. Figure 9). Then hot has two minimal upper
attributes and the above mentioned rule applied to the phrase hot pepper would
result in two frames: one representing a very spicy pepper [taste: hot] and one
representing a very warm pepper [temperature: hot], which could be part of a
dish. Due to space limits, we cannot go into more detail here, but a publication
focusing on this issue is in preparation.
4 Conclusion
We have presented a new approach to frames which discards the claim that the
central node of a frame is its root, which is a common claim in standard frame
theories. In addition, we have dismissed the artiVcial distinction between types
and attributes in type signatures. Those two adaptations enable us to give a
classiVcation of acyclic frame graphs that mirrors the classiVcation of concepts
into sortal, proper relational and functional concepts. In particular, the promising
fact that in our frame theory the structure of a functional (but also of a proper
relational) concept diUers fundamentally from that of the corresponding sortal
concept assures us that our modiVcations to standard frame theory can open up
new insights into concept decomposition.
However, a lot of work still has to be done. We need to develop a uniVca-
tion operation in order to account for frame composition. Individual concepts
also have to be accommodated in our frame theory. Furthermore, we expect the
discovery of new ways to explain phenomena from Velds such as composition,
metonymy, metaphors, and meronymy. Finally, powerful software devices have
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to be developed in order to test our frame model in real knowledge engineering
or language processing tasks.
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Notes on the reprint
This text was originally printed in 2007. It is one of the Vrst articles introducing a
formalization of Barsalou’s frame account and connecting it to Löbner’s classiV-
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cation of concept types (this volume). It has to be emphasized that the claim that
a frame reWects the type of the represented concept by pure graph properties (see
Figure 6) only holds for acyclic frame graphs of simple lexical concepts in their
basic reading. As soon as the argument of a relational concept is saturated, it is
not relational anymore. For example, while brother is a proper relational concept,
brother of Anne is a sortal concept denoting the set of all brothers of Anne. The
frame graphs for both concepts do not diUer with respect to the graph properties
discussed in the present article, but only with respect to node labels.
A similar problem occurs when concepts are shifted from one concept type
to another. For instance, take the functional concept Wat. A tenant can usually
only live in one Wat while a landlord can own more than one Wat. Hence, Wat
is a functional concept if it is read as the Wat of someone who is living there. It
is a proper relational concept if it is read as the Wat of someone who is renting
it out. Furthermore, Wat is shifted to a sortal concept when one abstracts away
from its function of living in or being rented out such that Wat solely refers to
the physical 3-dimensional object of a constellation of rooms. In order to account
for both argument saturation and concept type shifting, the argument nodes have
to be explicitly distinguished (see Petersen & Osswald 2014 for details).
At the end of Section 3, I discuss the idea of modeling adjectival modiVcation
in terms of minimal upper attributes. This idea has been worked out in Petersen
et al. (2008). However, note that this analysis is restricted to intersective adjec-
tives and captures adjectival modiVcation by means of modiVcation operations
on frames. An alternative solution with a broader coverage of diUerent adjective
types would consist of modeling adjectives as frames in their own right which are
composed with the noun frames via frame uniVcation.
Petersen, W. & T. Osswald (2014). Concept composition in frames: Focusing on genitive constructions.
In Gamerschlag et al. (eds.), Frames and Concept Types. Applications in Language, Cognition, and
Philosophy, vol. 94 of Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, 243–266. Springer: Heidelberg.
Petersen, W., J. Fleischhauer, H. Beseoglu & P. Bücker. A frame-based analysis of synaesthetic metaphors.
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2008.
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